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NOTE
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LEGAL STATUS OF AN
UNBORN CHILD: RECOGNITION OF A FETUS' AS
POTENTIAL LIFE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1973, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, held that a state has a
legitimate interest in protecting the "potentiality of human life."' The
Court also concluded that the constitutional right to privacy protects a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 4 Balancing a mother's
constitutional right to privacy in her body, and a state's interest in
protecting potential life, the Court wrote that a state's interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling only at the point of

viability.5 Thus, a state may regulate or proscribe abortion subsequent to
viability.6 However, a state may not prohibit an abortion necessary to
protect the life or health of the mother.7 Despite a state's interest in
protecting potential life, the health of the mother is placed above the
potential life of the fetus.8

1. In this Note, the terms "human being" and "parson" will be used interchangeably. The
terms "unborn child" and "fetus" will also be used interchangeably. In addition, the term "fetus"
will apply to the unborn throughout gestation. Technically, the term "embryo" is used to describe
an unborn child from the third through the eighth week of development. See KEITH L MOORE &
T.V.N. PERSAUD, THE DEvEOPNoG HUmmN: CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 53 1Sth ed.
1993). The ninth week of gestation marks the beginning of the fetal period. See id. at 93. The
name change signifies the development of an embryo into a recognizable human form. See id.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Id. at 150, 164-65 (explaining legitimacy of a state's interest in potential life).
4. See id. at 153.
5. See id. at 163. "Viability" is defined as "a reasonable likelihood of the fetus' sustained
survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,
388 (1979). Viability is reached between the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth week of gestation.
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
6. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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On September 14, 1999, the House of Representatives approved a
bill that would provide an unborn fetus legal protections independent of
the mother.9 The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 1999 (the "Bill")'0
treats as a separate federal crime, injury or death to an unborn child
caused by a third party while committing a federal offense against the
mother." The Bill defines the term "'unborn child'" as "a child in
utero. ' ' 2 The phrase "'child in utero"' or "'child, who is in utero' means
a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development,
who is carried in the womb."' 3 By attempting to enact a new statute that
would endow an unborn child with the same legal protections granted to
a "person," the legislature avoided both determining when a fetus
attained personhood and construing any existing statutes to encompass
the unborn.
Both the Supreme Court's "potential life" holding in Roe and the
House of Representatives' attempt to expand protections granted to an
unborn child illustrate the efforts of courts and legislatures to determine
the legal status of a fetus without deciding when a fetus becomes a
"person." This Note explores further the treatment of the unborn as
potential life without the resolution of its status as a person. Part II
discusses the treatment of a fetus under civil and criminal common law.
Part III argues that the protection afforded a fetus under current civil
and criminal law is based on a fetus' status as a "potential human life"
rather than a fetus' status as a "person." Part III also argues that the lack
of uniformity in the treatment of a fetus under wrongful death statutes
and homicide statutes is due to the refusal of courts and legislatures to
determine when a fetus acquires personhood entitling it to the full
protections of the law. Finally, Part IV proposes that potentiality
beginning at conception is the better standard for determining the legal
standing of an unborn child.

9. See Julie Rovner, Congress Considers Bill to ProtectFetuses, LANCEr, Sept. 25, 1999,
at 1105, available at 1999 WL 9764142.
10. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 1999 provides in part: "Whoever engages In
conduct that violates any of the provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the
death of, or bodily injury ... to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is
guilty of a separate offense ... " H.R. REP. No. 106-332, pt. 1, at 2 (1999).
11. See Rovner, supra note 9, at 1105.
12. H.R. REP. No. 106-332, pt. 1, at 2.
13. Id.
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II.

PRENATAL RIGHTS UNDER COMMON LAW

A.

Wrongful Death Action

Traditionally, common law did not recognize a civil cause of
action for the wrongful death of a person." Because a cause of action
died with the victim, the victim's heirs or dependents received no

compensation.' As a result, a tortfeasor was immune from all civil
liability when the injuries were severe enough to kill the victim." To

alleviate this harsh impact, the English Parliament enacted the Fatal
Accidents Act of 1846, also known as Lord Campbell's Act.'" Lord
Campbell's Act allowed relatives of a victim to recover damages from
the tortfeasor in a civil action. 8

Despite the acknowledgment of a wrongful death cause of action
by English law, courts in the United States refused to abandon the

common law and recognize civil liability for wrongful death." The
courts proffered various rationales for their refusal to limit the disparity
that resulted from recognizing a civil suit to recover damages for
injuries caused by a tortfeasor while failing to allow a suit to recover
damages when the same conduct caused the victim's death? Such
reasons included the notion that courts were not the proper forum for
attaching a pecuniary value to human life.!' Some courts argued that
calculating the monetary value of human life was impossible.e These
courts also reasoned that compensating a loss of life with money would
14. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522,525 (NV. Va. 1995) ("At common law, there was no
cause of action for the wrongful death of a person.").
15. See id.
16. See id. Under English common law, three restrictions limited the civil liability of a
tortfeasor in a personal injury suit. See id. at 525 n.6. First, the victim's cause of action died with
the tortfeasor. See id. Second, the victim's suit died with him. See id. Third, the relative- and
dependents of the victim had no cause of action against the tortfeasor for financial losses and
emotional pain caused by the death of the victim. See id.
17. See id. at 525. Lord Campbell's Act provided in part:
"[WIhenever the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of
another, in such a manner as would have entitled the party injured to have sued had
death not ensued, an action may be maintained if brought within twelve months after
[the] death in the name of [the] executor or administrator for the benefit of the wife.
husband, parent, and child of the person whose death shall have been so caused."
Id. (quoting Gary A. Meadows, Wrongful Death and the Lost Society of the Unborn, 13 J. LEGAL.
MED. 99, 100 n.9 (1992)) (alterations in original).
18. See id.
19. See id.

20. See Id. at 525-26.
21. See id. at 526.
22. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:931

undermine the Christian belief in the sanctity of life.' Other courts
feared that recognition of a wrongful death cause of action would result
in large verdicts. 24
Despite the resistance of courts to a wrongful death cause of action,
in 1847, the New York Legislature passed the first wrongful death
statute in the United States.2 Today, every state has enacted a wrongful
death statute that allows specific beneficiaries and/or the estate of a
decedent to recover damages against a tortfeasor for the losses resulting
from the victim's death.26
However, the enactment of wrongful death statutes by state
legislatures raised the issue of whether a wrongful death action could lie
for the death of a child caused by injuries inflicted in utero. Under
traditional tort law, a child had no personal injury cause of action for
harm suffered in utero, even if he or she was subsequently born alive.
The common law advanced the "single entity" theory, which asserted
that an unborn child and its mother were a single entity because an
unborn child "was not 'an independent biological entity."' 28 Thus, under
common law, a fetus was not a human being and not a legal person.29
Until 1946, the majority of courts followed this common law
approach. 0 Courts advanced two reasons for denying tort recovery to a
child born alive for injuries sustained in utero.3" First, courts were
concerned about the danger of fraudulent claims due to the difficulties
associated with establishing that a particular defendant's misconduct
actually caused the fetus' injury.32 Second, because an unborn child was
not recognized as a human being under the single entity theory, it had

23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 131 (Cal. 1977).
28. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526 (quoting Barbara E. Lingle, Comment, Allowing Fetal
Wrongful Death Actions in Arkansas: A Death Whose Time Has Come?, 44 ARK. L. REV. 465,
468-69 (1991)).
29. See Kayhan Parsi, MetaphoricalImagination: The Moral and Legal Status of Fetuses
and Embryos, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703, 718 (1999).
30. See Murphy S.Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: JurisprudentialInconsistencies
in Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933, 934 (1995).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 934-35.
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no legal existence at the time of the injury."3 Thus, a defendant owed a
fetus no duty of care.u
Justice Holmes relied on this single entity view in Dietrich v.
Inhabitantsof Northampton3 to deny recovery for injuries suffered by a
fetus in utero when the mother fell on a defective sidewalk." The court

explained that a child had no separate standing to sue for prenatal
injuries, since he or she was a part of the mother at the time of the
injury.37 However, any damage to the fetus was recoverable by the
mother as part of her suit.3'
A majority of jurisdictions have abandoned this traditional
approach and have extended wrongful death statutes to allow recovery
of pecuniary damages from the wrongdoer when a child is born alive

and subsequently dies from its prenatal injuries." The dissenting
opinion by Justice Boggs in Allaire v, St. Luke's Hospitat ' reflects the
initial impetus for change. Applying the single entity theory, the

majority held that no cause of action lay for injuries suffered by a fetus
in utero.4 However, Justice Boggs argued in his dissent, that a separate

cause of action should exist when a fetus is injured after reaching
viability and is subsequently born alive.2 According to Justice Boggs,

the single entity approach fails when applied to a fetus that is injured

33. See id. at 934; Parsi, supra note 29, at 718-19 (discussing Justice Holmes' holding in
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), that a fetus has no standing to sue,
at least in civil court, for injuries sustained in utero).
34. See Klasing, supra note 30, at 934.
35. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
36. See id. at 14, 17.
37. See id. at 17.
38. See id. Dietrich illustrates the fetus-as-appendage metaphor, %hich recognizes "the fetus
not as a being, which can be harmed, but rather a part of the mother, w'hich may be injured." Parsi,
supra note 29, at 719. The problems posed by this theory are evident %hen a fetus is compared to
an internal organ. See id. at 719-20. While an organ is necessary for the health of a p.rson, a fetus
is not. See id. Second, an organ possesses no intrinsic identity; it has no purpose except when
attached to a person. See id. at 720. An unborn child is at least a potential life. %,hichwill acquire
an independent purpose. See id. Third, even if the mother is allowed to recover for injuries to the
fetus as a part of her injuries, once born, the live child, with its independent existence, must suffer
the effects of the prenatal injuries. See id.
39. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Susan K. Pritchard, To Be or Not To Be: Protecting the
Unborn'sPotentialityof Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257,273 (1982).
40. 56 N.E. 638, 640 (111. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 640 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (reasoning "[t]hat a child before birth is, in fact, a
part of the mother, and is only severed from her at birth"). In 1953, the Supreme Court of Illinois
overruled Allaire. See Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 417-18 (111.1953). In Amann, the court
held that the Illinois Wrongful Death Act allows recovery for the death of a child %ho is born
alive, but dies from prenatal injuries inflicted at the stage of viability. See id.
42. See Allaire, 56 N.E. at 641-42 (Boggs, J., dissenting).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:931

and born alive with that injury, since the ramifications of that injury are
now borne by an independent and separate entity, and not the mother.43
The single entity theory remained dominant until 1946 when a
federal court held that a viable fetus is separate from the mother and has
T In Bonbrest v.
standing to maintain a suit for injuries inflicted in utero.
45
Kotz, the district court asserted that the failure to allow a child, who is
born alive, to maintain a suit for prenatal injuries inflicted at the stage of
viability, fosters "'a wrong ... for which there is no remedy. ' 46
' In
dicta, the court noted that "[flrom the viewpoint of the civil law and the
law of property, a child en ventre sa mere is not only regarded as a
human being, but as such from the moment of conception-which it is
in fact.'4' 7
B. CriminalLiability
During the nineteenth century, American courts
uniformly adopted
43
law:
criminal
of
context
the
in
Rule
Alive
Born
the
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it
in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her
body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision
[i.e., misdemeanor], and no murder; but if the childe be born alive and
dyeth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law it

43. See id. at 641 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (stating that the single entity theory "sacrific[es]
truth to a mere theoretical abstraction [when it] say[s that] the injury [is] not to the child, but
wholly to the mother").
44. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946) (distinguishing Dietrich v,
Inhabitantsof Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), on the basis that Dietrich involved a non-viable
fetus whereas Bonbrest involved a viable fetus). The Bonbrest court offered the following
explanation for its holding:
As to a viable child being "part" of its mother-this argument seems ... to be a
contradiction in terms. True, it is in the womb, but it is capable now of extrauterine
life-and while dependent for its continued development on sustenance derived from
its peculiar relationship to its mother, it is not a "part" of the mother in the sense of a
constituent element.... Modem medicine is replete with cases of living children being
taken from dead mothers.
Id. at 140.
45. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
46. Id. at 141 (quoting Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337, 345).
47. Id. at 140 (emphasis added). En ventre sa mere is defined as "(in its mother's womb."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 369 (6th ed. 1991). The phrase describes an unborn child. See id.
48. See Mary Lynn Kime, Note, Hughes v. State: The "Bons Alive" Rule Dies a Timely
Death, 30 TULSA L.J. 539, 541-42 (1995).
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is accounted
a reasonable creature, in rerunt natura, when it is born
49
alive.

Under the Born Alive Rule, a fetus was not considered a living human
being until after birth. " ' Because English common law defined homicide
as the killing of one human being by another,," no criminal liability was
imposed for the killing of a fetus. Under the Born Alive Rule,

homicide laws protected a child only after he or she was born alive : and
had attained an existence independent and separate from the mother.'

The Born Alive Rule was premised on a lack of sophisticated
medical knowledge and high prenatal mortality rates." This lack of
adequate medical technology rendered impossible the conclusion that a

fetus was alive until birth." Although quickening " established that a
child was alive in utero, the difficulties associated with ascertaining

49. Katharine B. Folger, Note, When Does Life Begin ...or End? The CaliforniaSupreme
Court Redefines FetalMurder in People v. Davis, 29 U.S.F. L REv. 237, 240 (1994) (quoting
Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1970)) (alteration in original) (fatonote
omitted); see also Klasing, supranote 30. at 952 (omitting the word "misprision" and inserting the
word "misdemeanor"). In retun natura is defined as "a 'living human being.'" Folger supra. at
240 n.26.
50. See Folger, supra note 49, at 240-41.
51. See id at 239; see also BLAcK's LAW DIcfIONARY 506 (6th cd. 1991) (defining criminal
homicide as, "purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causling] the death of another
human being"). Criminal homicide statutes have defined a covered person as -a human being %-.ho
has been born and is alive." N.Y. PENAL LAWv § 125.05(1) (MeKinney 1998); see also MoDnL
PENAL CODE § 210.0 (1980).
52. See Kirne, supra note 48, at 539-40.
53. Live birth consists of expulsion of the fetus from the womb and eidencc of life. Sce
Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal
Anachronisms,21 VAL. U. L. REV.563, 568 (1987). At least one author has recognized:
A child is considered alive if the child has an independent life of its oan for some
period, even momentarily, after birth, as evidenced by respiration or other indications
of life, such as beating of [the] heart and pulsation of arteries or heart tones in response
to artificial respiration, or pulsation of [the] umbilical cord after being severed.
Kime, supranote 48, at 541 n.24 (quoting BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 74 (6th ed. 1990)).
54. See Pamess & Pritchard, supra note 39, at 26869 (discussing People v. Smith 129 Cal.
Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976) and State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1979)).
55. See Folger, supranote 49, at 240; Cad L. Leventhal. Comment, The CrimesAgainstthe
Unborn Child Act: Recognizing PotentialHuman Life in PennsylvaniaCriminal Law, 103 DICK.
L. REV. 173, 175 (1998).
56. See Michael J. Davidson, Fetal Crime and Its Cognizability as a Criminal Offense
Under MilitaryLaw,1998 APIY LAw. 23, 24.
57. "Quickening is the first physical movement that is felt by the mother of the fetus in the
womb." Kime, supra note 48, at 541. "Quickening" occurs between the twelfth and sixteenth veek
of pregnancy. See Wendy L. Schoen, Note, Conflict in the ParametersDefining Life andDeath in
Missouri Statutes, 16 Amt. LL.& MED. 555, 565 (1990). The common law quickening doctrine
presumed "that the child was first 'endowed with life' at quickening." Fors)the, supra note 53, at
573.
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whether the child had died prior to, or during, labor and the delivery
process contributed to the acceptance of the Born Alive Rule."

The impossibility of determining whether and when a fetus was
living and when and how it died led to the difficulty of ascertaining
whether a defendant's misconduct was the cause of a fetus' death.59 In
homicide cases, the Born Alive Rule provided an evidentiary standard

for proving the corpus delictW of the homicide of an unborn child.6'
Adoption of the Born Alive Rule avoided the difficulty of establishing a
causal link between a defendant's misconduct and a fetus' death based
solely on speculation.6 2

m.

THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF A FETUS AS
"POTENTIAL HUMAN LIFE"

"The legal status of the unborn ... var[ies] from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, from context to context, according to our purposes." 3 This

inconsistent treatment of a fetus reflects "the 'cipher metaphor."' The
cipher metaphor assumes that a fetus "has no intrinsic status, but only

58. See Kime, supra note 48, at 541.
59. See id.; see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984)

(noting that the reason for the common law approach was a lack of certainty in establishing
whether the fetus was alive at the time the accused committed the act); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d
730, 732 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (explaining that common law refusal to protect a fetus as a
"person" was based on difficulty in establishing whether the fetus was alive at the time of the
defendant's conduct).
60. Corpus delicti is defined as "the objective proof or substantial fact that a crime has been
committed." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 239 (6th ed. 1991). The elements of corpus delicti of a
crime against an unborn include the following: "(1) proof of pregnancy or the existence of a live
fetus, (2) the death of the fetus, and (3) the criminal agency of the defendant (proximate
causation)." Forsythe, supra note 53, at 577.
61. See Folger, supra note 49, at 239-40. Clarke Forsythe argues that the Born Alive Rule
served an evidentiary purpose rather than a substantive definition of human being in the context of
homicide. See Forsythe, supra note 53, at 589. The following example illustrates the illogical
result stemming from the application of the single entity view and the Born Alive Rule:
If the rule was truly a substantive definition of human being, and a fetus only became a
human being at birth, then injuring an unborn child in utero would not be injuring a
human being. In that case, the death of the child out of the womb could not satisfy the
corpus delicti, because the criminal agency of the defendant-the moral connection
between the infliction of the injury and the resulting death-would not exist.
Id.

62. See Folger, supra note 49, at 240.
63. BONNIE STEtNBOCK, LaFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS
AND FETUSES 4(1992).
64. Parsi, supranote 29, at 716.
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what persons confer upon it."" Thus, the worth of a fetus is merely a
matter of social construction rather than its moral status as a "person.'"
This view is apparent in the attempt by courts to determine the
legal status of a fetus within the context of wrongful death statutes and
homicide statutes without resolving whether a fetus possesses the
intrinsic qualities necessary for attaining personhood."' Instead, courts
have relied on legislative intent, the rules of statutory construction, the
purpose of wrongful death liability and homicide convictions, logic,
precedent, and changes in medical science to ascertain the degree of
legal protection that should be granted to a fetus."
A.

Wrong/id Death

A majority of jurisdictions have extended the term "person" in
their wrongful death statutes to include a child injured in utero."
However, courts remain split as to the extent the term "person" applies
to an unborn child. 70 Courts disagree on two issues in the area of
prenatal torts.7' First, courts disagree regarding the developmental stage
at which a fetus must be when injured.' Second, courts disagree over
whether recovery is limited to a fetus who is born alive and
subsequently dies as a result of the prenatal injuries, or whether
beneficiaries may receive damages for the wrongful death of a stillborn
child.73
Three major approaches have developed in the attempt to define
the term "person" when applying a wrongful death statute to a fetus: a
fetus that is born alive; a viable unborn fetus; and a non-viable unborn
fetus.74
65. Id.
66. Kayhan Parsi asserts that fetal worth is a matter of social construction and convention on

the metaphysical level. See id. However, Parsi distinguishes fetal status on the epistemological
level, which is not purely of social convention. See id.

67. See, e.g., Vo v. Superior Court, 836 P.2d 408, 415 (Ariz. CL App. 19921 ("The much
larger metaphysical question of when does life begin? is not the subject of this opinion.'")

(quoting Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 SAV.2d 61, 61 (Ky. 1983)) (capitalization omitted).
68. See discussion infra Part HILA-B.

69. See Kime, supra note 48, at 550.
70. See Charles M. Kester, Note, Is There a Person in That Bodyv: An Argument for the
Priorityof Persons and the Need for a New Legal Paradigm. 82 GEO. LJ. 1643, 1648 & n.23
(1994).
71. See id.at 1648&n.23.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Michael P. McCready, Note, Recovry for the Wrongfil Death of a Fetus, 25 U.

RICH. L. REv. 391, 394-96 (1991). In the legal context, viability and non-viability refer to the
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1. Born Alive
In Endresz v. Friedberg,7" the New York Court of Appeals

dismissed a wrongful death suit for the death of a viable, unborn fetus. 6
New York's wrongful death statute provides damages to "'[t]he
personal representative ...of a decedent."'" Relying on the term
"decedent," the court reasoned that a "decedent" cannot exist without a
person being born alive.78

The court also referred to the treatment of a fetus in other areas of

the law.79 The court noted that, under property and inheritance laws, the

rights of an unborn child do not perfect until live birth. 0
Acknowledging that a child who is born alive may maintain a
personal injury suit to recover damages for prenatal injuries, the court
distinguished the impact of the injuries on a child who is subsequently
born alive and a child who dies in utero. The court noted that natural

justice demands "recognition of the legal right of every human being to
begin life unimpaired by physical or mental defects [caused by] the
negligence of another."'" However, the court asserted that such an
argument does not apply to an unborn child who will never endure the

difficulties associated with impaired mental or physical health."
Another argument proffered by the court in support of its holding
involves the problems associated with damages and causation."

Damages in a wrongful death action are limited to pecuniary losses."
point in prenatal development at which the fetus is injured and a cause of action may, or may not,
arise. See id.
75. 248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969).
76. See id. at 906.
77. Id. at 903 (quoting New York's wrongful death statute) (alteration in original). New
York's wrongful death statute provides in part:
"The personal representative ... of a decedent who is survived by distributees may
maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default which
caused the decedent's death against a person who would have been liable to the
decedent by reason of such wrongful conduct if death had not ensued."
Id. (quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (MeKinney 1967)) (alteration in original).
New York's wrongful death statute is representative of wrongful death statutes in other states. See
Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 526 (W. Va. 1995) (describing that, after New York adopted a
wrongful death statute, every other state followed by enacting a similar wrongful death statute).
78. See Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 903.
79. See id. at 904.
80. See id.; see also, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (Working Draft No. 5 1969)
("Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter shall inherit as if they
had been born in the lifetime of the decedent.") (emphasis added).
81. Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at903.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 903-04.
84. See id. at 903.
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The court reasoned that "proof of pecuniary injury and causation is
immeasurably more vague than in suits for prenatal injuries" and "the
[l]egislature did not intend to authorize the maintenance of a wrongful
death action where there are no 'elements whatever upon which a jury
could base any conclusion that a pecuniary injury has been suffered by
the plaintiff."' The court summarized its position in the following
manner: "ITjhere is but a 'conditional prospective liability ... created
when an unborn child ... is injured' through the wrongful act of the

defendant, and such liability attaches only upon fulfillment of the
condition that the child be born alive."'"
Justus v. Atchisoir presented the California Supreme Court with
the issue of whether a stillborn fetus is a "person" under the state's
wrongful death statute." Deferring to legislative intent, the court denied
recovery to the parents of an unborn fetus injured when the defendant
negligently failed to provide proper obstetrical and surgical care during
delivery. 9 The court asserted that the legislature occupied the field with
regard to recovery in wrongful death actions when it enacted the
wrongful death statute.' Thus, whether the court may permit recovery
for the wrongful death of an unborn fetus depended on "whether the
[liegislature intend[ed the wrongful death statute] to provide a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus.""°
The court examined the treatment of unborn fetuses in other areas
of the law to determine legislative intent. Referring to property law, the
court acknowledged that, an unborn child has a property interest under
inheritance law, and may be represented by guardians ad litem?9
However, perfection of this interest is contingent upon live birth. 3 The
court also explored the status of a fetus for purposes of compensation in
a personal injury suit.' Recovery for prenatal injuries is limited to a
child who is born alive.' The court then examined the legal status of a

85. Id. (quoting Butler v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 38 N.E. 454, 455 (N.Y. 1894)) (emphasis
added).
86. Id. at 905 (quoting Keyes v. Constr. Serv., 165 N.E.2d 91.

915 (Mass. 1960))

(alterations in original).
87. 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977).
88. See id. at 124.
89. See id. at 124-25, 130-32.
90. See id. at 129.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 131.
93. See id.
94. See 1d.

95. See id.
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fetus under California's criminal law.96 In Keeler v. Superior Court,w the
California Supreme Court had interpreted the term "human being" in
California's homicide statute to exclude an unborn child. 98 Subsequent
to Keeler, the California Legislature redefined the term "human being"
to include a "fetus" as a murder victim. 9 The Justus court thus
concluded that, in the absence of express legislative mandate, the term
"person" in California's wrongful death statute may not be construed to
include an unborn fetus.' °°
The Justus court further justified its refusal to recognize a fetus as
a "person" by distinguishing the loss suffered by the parents of a
stillborn child from the loss of a child born alive. 0 ' The court observed
that a meaningful child-parent relationship does not begin until birth.""
It commented:
The parents of a stillborn fetus have never known more than a
mysterious presence dimly sensed by random movements in the
womb; but the mother and father of a child born alive have seen,
touched, and heard their baby, have witnessed his developing
personality, and have started the lifelong process of communicating
and interacting with him.
2. Viable, Unborn Child
In 1949, Minnesota was the first state to reject the Born Alive Rule
and adopt a viability standard for determining the legal status of a fetus
in the context of a wrongful death action' ° Following Verkennes v.
Corniea,'°5 other courts also adopted the viability rule as the criterion for
deciding whether a fetus is a "person," a "human being," or an
"individual" under their state's wrongful death statute."" These courts
have reasoned that the following rationales offered in support of the
common law approach are not "maintainable":
96. See id. at 131-32.
97. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
98. See id. at 628-31.
99. See Justus, 565 P.2d at 132.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 133.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See Klasing, supra note 30, at 941.
105. 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
106. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 528 (W. Va. 1995) (noting that the majority of
jurisdictions allow wrongful death actions for the death of an unborn child who has reached
viability); see also Klasing, supra note 30, at 941-51 (discussing how different courts apply the
concept of viability in civil cases).
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(1) [There is a] lack of precedent; (2) an unborn child is a part of its
mother until birth and has no juridical existence; (3) such action would
open the door to fraudulent claims the proof of which would be
speculative and difficult; and (4) the cause of action for the wrongful
death of an unborn viable child should be created by the [1legislature
instead of being recognized by the courts.107
Although courts have offered various reasons for permitting
recovery of damages for the wrongful death of a viable, unborn child,
these courts have advocated adoption of the viability rule without
inquiring into whether a viable fetus possesses the characteristics
necessary for personhood.
In Verkennes, the Minnesota Supreme Court, for the first time,
addressed the issue of "whether the ... administrator of the estate of an
unborn infant, which dies prior to birth as the result of another's
negligence, has a cause of action on behalf of the next of kin of [the]
unborn infant under [Minnesota's] wrongful death statute."'t' The court
held that Minnesota law provides a cause of action for the wrongful
death of a viable fetus."° Thus, under Minnesota's wrongful death
statute, the representative of an unborn child may recover damages for
the wrongful death of the child, if the injury that causes the subsequent
death is inflicted after the fetus becomes viable."0
Rejecting the single entity theory, the Verkennes court based its
conclusion on the following reasoning:
"[If... [the unborn child] reaches the prenatal age of viability

when the destruction of the life of the mother does not necessarily end
its existence also, and when, if separated prematurely, and by artificial
means, from the mother, it would be so far a matured human being as
that it would live and grow, mentally and physically .... it is but to
deny a palpable fact to argue there is but one life, and that the life of
the mother. Medical science and skill and experience have
demonstrated that at a period of gestation in advance of the period of
parturition the foetus is capable of independent and separate life, and
that, though within the body of the mother, it is not merely a part of
her body, for her body may die in all of its parts and the child remain
alive, and capable of maintaining life.... "

107. Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428, 434 (W. Va. 1971).
108. Verkennes, 38 N.W.2d at 839.

109. See id. at 841.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 840 (quoting Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638. 641 11l.1900) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting)) (some alterations in original).
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The Verkennes court asserted that the single entity theory is also

irreconcilable when applied to a viable fetus who is born alive, since the
child, not the mother, endures the incapacity and inconvenience
resulting from the injury."2
The Minnesota Supreme Court also rejected arguments cited by
other courts that advocated continued adherence to the Born Alive
Rule."3 The Verkennes court recognized that the absence of precedent

acknowledging a wrongful death action for the death of a viable, unborn
child does not justify granting immunity to a party whose wrongful
conduct causes the death of a fetus." 4 The court also agreed with other

jurisdictions that found the fear of fraudulent claims insufficient to deny
recognition of an otherwise meritorious claim."' The court similarly
maintained that the issue of whether an unborn fetus is entitled to
protection under Minnesota's wrongful death statute is limited to a
determination as to whether a fetus has such a right, and that the
difficulties 6 associated with implementing a viability standard are
irrelevant."
In Summerfield v. Superior Court,"7 the Arizona Supreme Court
interpreted the term "person" in Arizona's wrongful death statute to

encompass a viable, unborn child."8' The Summerfield court rejected the
notion that a lack of precedent requires continued adherence to the
common law."9 The court noted that, because the legislature failed to
define the term "person" in the statute, the court has the obligation to
construe the word in accordance with the treatment of an unborn child

112. See id. at 840 ("'If a right of action be denied to the child it will be compelled, without
any fault on its part, to go through life carrying the seal of another's fault and bearing a very heavy
burden of infirmity and inconvenience without any compensation....') (quoting Montreal
Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337, 344).
113. Seeid.at841.
114. See id. ("'The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those who by their
wrongful act ... have invaded the right of an individual ... ') (quoting Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65
F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946)).
115. See id.
116. See id. ("'We are concerned here only with the right and not its implementation."')
(quoting Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946)).
117. 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985).
118. Seeid.at724.
119. The court refused to "assume that the Territorial Legislature of 1887 was necessarily
supplied with or interested in the erudite reasoning or thorough research which supported Holmes'
decision, [rejecting wrongful death causes of action for stillborn fetuses] made three years earlier."
Id. at 720. Rather, the court chose to "study... the statute, the best method to further the general
goal of the legislature in adopting such a statute, and common law principles governing its
application." Id.
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in other areas of the law."' Consequently, the court concluded that
legislative policy regarding the compensation and protection of a fetus
requires the court to construe the wrongful death statute so as to allow
the parents of a viable fetus who is negligently killed to recover
damages.
In Stidwn v. Ashmore, "' the Ohio Court of Appeals inquired as to
"whether an action may be maintained for the wrongful death of a
viable, unborn child which is subsequently stillborn."'' The court
argued that both the language of the state's wrongful death statute and
logic lead to the conclusion that a wrongful death cause of action exists
when the victim is an unborn, viable fetus.' First, the test for
determining the existence of a right under Ohio's wrongful death statute
is whether the injury "'would have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action and recover damages if death had not ensued."" If the
tortfeasor's negligent conduct had injured the unborn child, but had not
caused its death, the child would have been able to recover in tort for
the injuries inflicted in utero.1:6
Second, the court offered the following twin hypothetical to
emphasize the "bizarre results" associated with recognizing a cause of
action if death occurs after birth, while prohibiting all recovery if death
occurs before birth:
Suppose, for example, viable unborn twins suffered simultaneously the
same prenatal injury of which one died before and the other after birth.
Shall there be a cause of action for the death of the one and not for that
of the other? Surely logic requires recognition of causes of action for
the deaths of both, or for neither.'

120. See id. at 720-21.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id. at 721.
167 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
Id. at 106.
See id. at 107.
Id. (quoting Ohio's wrongful death statute). The Ohio wrongful death statute provides in

part:
"When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default %,
hich
would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if
death had not ensued ...the person who would have been liable if death had not
ensued ... shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the
person injured ......
Id. (quoting Ohio's wrongful death statute) (alterations in original).
126. See id. at 107-08 (citing to Jasinsky v. Potts, 92 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Ohio 1950), %hich
held that tort law recognizes a cause of action for prenatal injuries).
127. Id. at 108.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 29:931

The twin hypothetical illustrates the "absurd" and illogical result of
rewarding the tortfeasor by allowing him or her to escape liability if his
or her negligent conduct inflicts injuries severe enough to cause a fetus'
death before birth." In essence, "the greater the harm inflicted, the
better the opportunity that a defendant will be exonerated."'29 The court
asserted that, as the Ohio Supreme Court had already determined,
because there is a cause of action when death occurs after birth, there is
"no valid reason" for denying recovery of damages to a child who dies
before birth. 3 °
In Werling v. Sandy, 3 ' an Ohio court again, for other reasons, held
that a viable fetus is a "person" under the wrongful death statute even if
it dies in utero' 32 The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the purpose
of the "statute is to provide a remedy whenever there would have been
an action in damages had death not ensued."' 33 The court therefore relied
on the remedial nature of the wrongful death statute.'3 The court argued
that the purpose of a wrongful death statute is "to alleviate the inequity
perceived in the common law" by removing the immunity enjoyed by a
tortfeasor whose conduct is severe enough to cause an unborn child's
death. 31 In addition, the court held that, because a remedy under the
wrongful death statute is intended to compensate parents for the loss of
parenthood, the parent of36 a viable fetus, subsequently stillborn, has
standing under the statute.
The court further argued that "[t]he requirement of birth in this
respect is an artificial demarcation.' ' 37 The Born Alive Rule does not
allow recovery for the wrongful death of a child if the trauma inflicted
by a third party kills the child in utero; but, if the injury is less serious
so that the child survives, the law permits recovery. 3 1 If the fatality is
immediate, the suit cannot prevail, but if the death is delayed by a few
hours, even minutes, beyond birth, the claim can succeed. 39
128. See id.
129. Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ohio 1985).
130. See Stidam, 167 N.E.2d at 108.
131. 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985).
132. See id. at 1056.
133. Id. at 1054.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 1054, 1055.
136. See id. at 1054.
137. Id. at 1055.
138. See id. (using the twin hypothetical espoused by the court in Stidam v. Ashmore, 167
N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959)).
139. See id. (using the twin hypothetical espoused by the court in Stidam v. Ashmore, 167
N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959)).
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In Baldwin v. Butcher,'0 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals also expanded its wrongful death statute to provide
compensation for the wrongful death of a viable, unborn child."' The
court rejected the arguments frequently offered in support of the
common law approach. 42 First, the Baldwin court asserted that the fear
of fraud and the difficulties associated with proving causation and
damages do not justify barring meritorious claims, since such issues
have "no bearing upon the validity of the cause of action."'4 3
Second, the court reasoned that, if a child is injured at the stage of
viability, the third party's liability should not turn on whether "the death
occurs just before [birth] or just after the child is born." '" Relying on
the twin hypothetical first introduced in Stidam, the court noted "[t]he
injustice and the patently illogical result of' allowing an action for the
wrongful death of a fetus injured after viability and subsequently born
death of a fetus injured
alive, but denying an action for the wrongful
45
stillborn.'
subsequently
and
after viability
Third, the Baldwin court demonstrated "[t]he incongruity and ...
injustice of the" single entity theory.' 5 In the absence of a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a viable, unborn child, the injury
inflicted on a fetus remains uncompensated. 4' 7 The court emphasized
that, even under the single entity theory, the law does not permit a
mother to recover damages for the death of a stillborn child as a part of
her tort suit.' 4' Thus, the failure to recognize a viable, unborn child as
within the wrongful death statute results in "no recovery ... for a tort
which is separate and independent [from the tort] which caused the
injuries of the mother."'' 9 The court offered the following example to
illustrate the "incongruity and the injustice" of failing to encompass a
fetus within the wrongful death statute: A doctor who is negligent in the
delivery of a child may be liable if he injures the child and the child is

140. 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).
141. See id. at 436. In 1995, the West Virginia Supreme Court of App.als expandzd its
holding in Baldwin to provide protection to a nonviable fetus. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d
522,523 (W. Va. 1995).

142. See Baldwin, 184 S.E.2d. at 434, 436.
143. Id. at 434.

144. Id. at 435.
145. See id.
146. Id.

147. See id.
148. See id.

149. Id.
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subsequently born alive, but he is immune from all liability if his
misconduct causes the death of the unborn child. 50
Finally, the court examined the rights possessed by an unborn child
under common law. 5' The court recognized that the law provides
processes for protecting property belonging to an unborn child by
allowing "'[an unborn child to] have a legacy, [to] own an estate, and
[to have] a guardian... assigned to it.
"'''1 2 The Baldwin court noted that
it is "'illogical, unrealistic, and unjust ...for the law to withhold its
processes ... for the protection of the person of an unborn child, while,
at the same time, making such processes available for the purpose of
protecting its property."" 53
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in DiDonato v. Wortman,L
also adopted the viability standard to determine that a nine-month-old
stillborn fetus is a "person" covered under the wrongful death statute. 5
The court stated:
The language of [the] wrongful death statute, its legislative history,
and recognition of the statute's broadly remedial objectives compel
[the court] to conclude that any uncertainty in the meaning of the word
"person" should be resolved in favor of permitting an action to recover
for the destruction of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere.56
The court relied on the language of the statute, which provides in part:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or
default of another, such as would, if the injured person had lived, have
entitled him to an action for damages therefor, the person ...that
would have been so liable ...shall be liable to an action for
damages...."'
The court construed this language to mean that a beneficiary may
maintain a wrongful death action "if the decedent could have
maintained an action for negligence or some other misconduct if he [or

150. See id.
151. See id. at 435-36.
152. Id. at 436 (quoting Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d. 909, 910
(Ga. 1951)).
153. Id. (quoting Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909, 911 (Ga.
1951)).
154. 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987).
155. See id. at 493.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 490 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984)) (second and third alterations in
original).
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she] had survived."' 58 Because a child born alive could recover in tort
for prenatal injuries, the court concluded that the wrongful death statute

encompasses a viable fetus, which dies in utero."' The DiDonato court
also reasoned that recognizing a viable, unborn child within the

wrongful death statute furthers the policies underlying the enactment of
a wrongful death statute, namely, to "compensat[e the] beneficiaries of
the decedent's estate for their lossoI and... deter dangerous conduct."'"

3. Nonviable, Unborn Child
In recent years, a few courts have rejected both the Born Alive
Rule and the viability rule in an effort to expand their state's wrongful

death statute to include unborn fetuses from the moment of
conception.'

In 1976, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Presley 1%

Newport Hospital 2 refused to address the plaintiff's allegation that the
fetus was viable at the time of the injury that subsequently caused her

death.' 63 The court limited its inquiry to "whether ...the language of

[the wrongful death statute] permit[ted] a reading of the word 'person'
to include a fetus which die[d] en ventre sa mere."'' " Allowing the

parents of the unborn child to sustain their suit, the court held that "the
decedent, whether viable or nonviable, [is] a 'person' within the
meaning of the Wrongful Death Act."'65 As a basis for its holding, the
court referred to the rationale adopted by courts in rejecting the Born
158. Id.at491.
159. See id. at 492-93.
160. Id. at 493.
161. However, a majority of jurisdictions have refused to acknov,ledge Tongful death
actions for children injured prior to viability and who are not born alive. See YViersma v. Maple
Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 790 (S.D. 1996). To support its conclusion, the I1iersma court cites
Gentry v Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241, 1242 (Ala. 1993) (thirteen-week-old fetus): Ferguson V.
District of Columbia, 629 A.2d 15 (D.C. 1993) (nonviable fetus); Humes s. Clinton. 792 P.2d
1032, 1035 (Kan. 1990) (sixteen-and-one-half-week-old fetus); Angelini v. OMD Corp., 575
N.E.2d 41, 43 (Mass. 1991) (nonviable fetus); Fryover v Forbes, 446 N.\V2d 292, 292 (Mieh.
1989) (nonviable fetus); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 135 (N.H. 1980) (ten to tevlv-v,c-,.kold fetus); Guyer v. Hugo Publishing Co., 830 P.2d 1393, 1393 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (thre-andone-half-month-old fetus); Covelesld v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 603, 603 (Pa. 1993) (cight-week-old
fetus); Miccolis v AMICA Mutual Insurance Co., 587 A.2d 67, 68 (R.L 1991) (fi.e-%eek-old
fetus); West v McCoy, 105 S.E.2d 88 (S.C. 1958) (five-week-old fetus).
162. 365 A.2d 748 (RI. 1976).
163. See id. at 754.
164. Id. at 750.
165. Id. at 754. Although the majority declined to give weight to the viability issue, the
decedent in Presleyv NewportHospitalwas actually a viable fetus. See id. at 749. Thus, %%henthe
Rhode Island Supreme Court was confronted with an action for the wongful death of a nonviable
fetus, the court held that the state's wrongful death statute did not recognize such a cause of
action. See Miccolis,587 A.2d at 69.
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Alive Rule in favor of the viability test.' 66 The Presley court inferred

that, if reason leads to the conclusion that live birth is an artificial
demarcation, then "it [is] seditious to adopt so arbitrary and uncertain a
concept as viability as a dividing line between those persons who shall

enjoy the protection of our remedial laws and those who shall become
... nonentities."'

67

The court further relied on its holding in Sylvia v.

Gobeille,' in which it permitted a cause of action by an individual who
sued for injuries sustained as a nonviable fetus."
In Rambo v. Lawson, 71 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that
Missouri law recognizes a cause of action for the wrongful death of a
nonviable fetus. 7' The court first noted that viability is no longer an
accurate demarcation for determining the legal status of a fetus.'
Because of advances in medical technology, an unborn child, which was

nonviable, may now be kept alive outside of the
once considered
173
womb.

The court also relied on the language of Missouri's wrongful death
statute to reach its conclusion: "'[A] cause of action for wrongful death
will lie whenever the person injured would have been entitled to recover
from the defendant but for the fact that the injury resulted in death."" 4
The court maintained that, "Ulust as a viable fetus could develop into a

person capable of maintaining a cause of action, so could a nonviable
to bring a personal injury suit for
fetus develop into such a person" able
7
the harm inflicted by the tortfeasor.
166. See Presley, 365 A.2d at 753-54.
167. Id. at 754.
168. 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966).
169. See Presley, 365 A.2d at 753. In Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966), the Rhode
Island Supreme Court explicitly refused to determine whether a child must be born alive in order
to bring a suit for injuries inflicted in utero, before the fetus reaches viability. See id. at 224.
170. No. WD 41,747, 1990 Mo. App. LEXIS 654, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. May 1, 1990).
171. See id. at *19. The Missouri wrongful death statute allows parents to maintain a
wrongful death action for the loss of a "minor child." See id. at *1 n.1 (citing Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.080(1) (1986)).
172. See id. at *6.
173. See id.; see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 457
& n.5 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that, in 1973, viability before twenty-eight weeks
was rare, but that, just ten years later, a twenty-two-week-old fetus was capable of surviving
outside the womb); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 139 (N.H. 1980) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(commenting "that with 'recent advances in technology, viability has been pushed back from the
twenty-eighth to the twentieth week of pregnancy"') (quoting Robert M. Bym, Abortion.onDemand: Whose Morality?, 46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 5, 12 (1970)).
174. Rambo, 1990 Mo. App. LEXIS 654, at *11 (quoting the interpretation of Mo. REV.
STAT. § 537.080 (1986) in O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo. 1983)).
175. Id. In addressing whether an action for wrongful death can stand when no sustainable
life exists, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals responded:
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However, in 1990, the Missouri Supreme Court overruled the
Missouri Court of Appeals' holding.' The majority held that a fetus is
not a "person" within the wrongful death statute." Today, the viability
rule governs the legal status of a fetus in wrongful death actions in
Missouri 7 8

B. Homicide Statutes
Despite the willingness of courts to abandon the Born Alive Rule
in the area of tort law, with respect to homicide statutes, courts have
been reluctant, in the absence of express legislative mandate, to expand
the term "person" to include an unborn child.'; Courts have consistently
advanced two reasons for their refusal to expand criminal liability
beyond the Born Alive Rule. First, the area of criminal law is purely
statutory; thus, the presumption that the legislature intended to adhere to
common law principles is limited."'t Second, differing rules of statutory
interpretation apply to criminal law and tort law.' As a result, courts
have avoided addressing the issue of whether a fetus is an actual
"person" entitled to full and equal legal protection under criminal law.
1. Born Alive Rule-Murder Statutes
Courts have advocated continued acceptance of the Born Alive
Rule when interpreting murder statutes, despite advances in medical
technology that have weakened the rationale underlying the common
law approach.'2 At the same time, many of these same courts have
abandoned the Born Alive Rule in their recognition of an unborn, viable

The concept underlying our survival statute is that the representative is merely bringing

a lawsuit that decedent could have brought had he or she not died. Where the fetus
emerges from the mother without the developmental capacity to survive, it would

contradict the theory of a survival action to provide a cause of action to the
representative of the fetus. Absent clear indication of contrary legislative intent, it
would be anomalous to view an action as one that could have been brought by the fetus
had the fetus not died when the fetus had never developed the capacity to survive in the
first place.

Ferguson v. District of Columbia, 629 A.2d 15, 17 (D.C. 1993).
176. See Rambo v. Lawson, 799 SAv.2d 62, 62 (Mo. 1990).
177. See id. at 63-64.
178. See, e.g., May v. Greater Kan. City Dental Soc'y, 863 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Mo. CL App.
1993) (affirming the rule set forth by Missouri's Supreme Court in Rambo as controlling).

179. See Klasing, supra note 30, at 950-51.
180.
181.
182.
rationale

See discussion infra Part IIB.1.
See discussion infra Part IIILB.1.
See Kime, supra note 48, at 543-44. For an explanation of the traditional common law
for adhering to the Born Alive Rule, see supraPart ILB.
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fetus as a "person" or "human being" within the wrongful death
statute.1 83 To reconcile "this inconsistency,"' 4 courts have cited the
"[d]iffering objectives and considerations in tort and criminal law [that]
foster the development of different principles governing the same
factual situation."1 85
In State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson,8 6 when presented with the
question of whether a fetus is protected under West Virginia's murder
statute, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals phrased the issue
as "whether [the court had] the authority to alter the common law rule
that an unborn child cannot be the victim of a murder."' 87 In Baldwin v.
Butcher,'88 this same court permitted a wrongful death action for the
death of a viable, unborn child.'89 Nonetheless, the Atkinson court
refused to extend the same protection to an unborn, viable fetus under
its murder statute.' The court distinguished its "power to evolve
common law principles in areas in which it has traditionally functioned,
i.e., the tort law, and in those areas in which the legislature has primary
or plenary power, i.e., the creation and definition of crimes and
penalties."'91 Thus, when the court interpreted the wrongful death statute
to include a viable fetus, it was acting within its authority.'9 The court
explained that it did not, however, have the power 91to
3 extend the same
protection to a viable fetus under the murder statute.
The court also explained that policy reasons require courts to defer
to their respective legislatures when creating new crimes."' First,
because the legislature consists of individuals "proportionately elected
at ... frequent intervals ... [it] is more closely attuned to and
representative of the public will than" the courts.'95 Second, the
legislature has the capacity to consider various factual situations and to

183. See Kime, supra note 48, at 544.
184. Id.
185. People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (Ill. 1980).
186. 332 S.E.2d 807 (V. Va. 1984).
187. Id. at 809.
188. 184 S.E.2d 428 (,V. Va. 1971).
189. See id. at 436. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has since extended the
state's wrongful death statute to cover nonviable fetuses as well. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d
522, 534 (,V. Va. 1995) (recognizing an unborn, nonviable fetus as a "person" within West
Virginia's wrongful death statute).
190. See State ex rel. Atkinson, 332 S.E.2d at 812.
191. Id. at 810.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Id.
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grade "the penalties to match the severity of [particular] offenses.""
limited to issuing a judgment based solely
The courts, conversely, are
197
them.
before
facts
the
on

Vo v. Superior Court'" required the Arizona Court of Appeals to
"decide whether the killing of a fetus can constitute first degree murder
under" Arizona's homicide statute.'" Despite the Arizona Supreme
Court's holding in Sununerfield v. Superior Couriwo permitting a tort

action for the wrongful death of a viable, unborn fetus,' the Vo court
excluded a viable, unborn fetus from the definition of "person" in the
context of criminal homicide.' 2 The court distinguished its power to
expand the definition of "person" in a civil action such as that in
Surnnerfield from its authority to extend the applicability of a homicide
statute.?0 3 First, the court identified Arizona as a "code state"' Arizona had abolished all common law crimes and only the legislature
retained authority to define and create crimes.' Thus, the courts are
"legislatively precluded from creating new crimes by expanding the

common law through judicial decision.":' Because the legislature is
presumed to have been aware of the viability standard articulated by the
Summerfield court when enacting the murder statute, its failure to
expressly define the term "person" to include a viable fetus reflects the
legislature's intent to exclude an unborn, viable child from the
protection of the murder statute. : 7

196. Id.
197. See id.
198. 836 P.2d 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
199. Id. at 409. Arizona's murder statute provides in part: "'A person commits first dzgree
murder if: 1. Knowing that his conduct will cause death, such person causes the death of another
with premeditation."' Id. at 411 (quoting Arizona's first degree murder statute). According to the
Vo court, "the term 'another' refers by implication to 'another person.'" Id. at 411 n.2 (citing to
State v Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1978), which construed Utah's automobile homicide
statute). Section 13-1101(3) of Arizona's homicide statute defines the term "'person'" as "'a
human being."' See id. at 411 (quoting Arizona's homicide statute).
200. 698 P.2d712 (Ariz. 1985).
201. See id. at 724.
202. See Vo, 836 P.2d at 418, 419.
203. See id. at 417-18.
204. See id. at 417. A "'code' state" is defined as a state in which "the [ljegislature has the
exclusive province to define by statute what acts constitute a crime." People v. Da%is, 872 P.2d
591, 599 (Cal. 1994).
205. See Vo, 836 P.2d at417-18.
206. Id. at 417.
207. See id. at 413, 414.
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Second, Arizona's wrongful death statute is a remedial statute, 2°S
which must be liberally construed to provide a remedy."l Conversely, a
court must interpret criminal statutes to give "fair warning" so as to
preserve a defendant's constitutional right to due process. ° Thus, the
court could "not expand the scope of a crime by judicial decision to
punish a defendant for an act that was not criminal when it was
performed. 21 In effect, the Vo court held that, in the absence of an
express legislative mandate, it may not criminalize the killing of an
unborn fetus.212
In People v. Greer,2 3 the Illinois Supreme Court dealt with the
issue of whether the killing of an unborn fetus constituted murder, an
issue of first impression for the court.2 4 The court noted the illogical
results of the Born Alive Rule, which conditioned liability "on the
precise time when the fetus expire[d]. 2 5 If the fetus was born alive,
took a single breath, and subsequently died, the defendant could be
convicted for homicide. 6 However, if the fetus died during birth, or
immediately before birth, the defendant escaped all criminal liability.2 7
Despite the court's recognition of a cause of action for the wrongful
death of a viable, unborn fetus, 28 the court refused to recognize a viable,
unborn fetus as an "individual" under the murder statute. 9
The court offered two reasons for its allegiance to the common law
rule in the criminal context. First, it referred to the Supreme Court's
holding in Roe v. Wade that an unborn child, viable or nonviable, is not
a person entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment

208. See Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11, 14 (Idaho 1982) (stating that wrongful death statutes
are remedial in nature).
209. See, e.g., Sumnmerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 721 (Ariz. 1985) (noting that a
wrongful death statute must be construed to reach its "remedial objective of compensating
survivors").
210. Constitutional "[d]ue process requires that a criminal statute give fair warning of the
conduct which it prohibits." Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 735 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); see also
Vo, 836 P.2d at 413 ("'The first essential of due process is fair warning of the act which is made
punishable as a crime."') (quoting Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 626 (Cal. 1970)).
211. Vo, 836 P.2d at 413.
212. See id.
213. 402 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1980).
214. See id. at 206. Illinois' murder statute "provides that '[a] person who kills an individual
without lawful justification commits murder."' Id. (quoting an Illinois murder statute) (alteration
in original).
215. Id. at 207.
216. See id.

217. See id.
218. See, e.g., Green v. Smith, 377 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ill. 1978).
219. See Greer,402 N.E.2d at 208.
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of the United States Constitution. ' Second, the court acknowledged
that recognizing a fetus as a person under tort and property laws, while
refusing to grant a fetus legal protection under criminal law, creates a
lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence. 2' The court noted,
however, that this lack of uniformity has not prevented other
jurisdictions from extending the benefits of tort law to unborn fetuses
while refusing to extend the protections of criminal law to them.'As in Greer, some courts have relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe to strengthen their justification for making live birth the
demarcation for conferring legal status on a fetus under criminal law.
However, other courts have not interpreted the Supreme Court's holding
as a restraint on their ability to abandon the Born Alive Rule in this
context[" These courts have established viability as the standard for
determining when a fetus becomes a "person,"
"human being," or
5
homicide.=
criminal
of
purposes
for
"individual"
In Hollis v. Conunonivealth, 6 the Kentucky Supreme Court also
refused to abandon the Born Alive requirement and declared that a
viable fetus is not a "person" within the murder statute.2 However, the
court narrowly interpreted the holding in Roe as solely "declar[ing] that
the mother's right to privacy in the early stages of her pregnancy, and
her health in the last stage of pregnancy when the fetus is viable, have
constitutional protection before the life of the fetus." ' The Hollis court
refused to view the Roe decision as establishing a standard for
determining when a fetus should be recognized as a "person. ' - The
Hollis court also commented on the constitutional problems associated
with interpreting the term "person" in the state's murder statute to
include a viable, unborn fetus." The court pointed to the difficulties
inherent in determining whether a particular fetus was viable at the time
of its injuries or death and whether the defendant knew, or should have
220. See id.
221. See id. at 208-09.

222. See id.
223. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591,597 (Cal. 1994).
224. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730,734-45 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).

225. See id. at 731; see also Klasing, supra note 30, at 956-59 (describing how viability
became the standard for applying homicide statutes to unborn fetuses in Washington,
Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Oklahoma).
226. 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).

227. See id. at 65 (holding that the unwanted death of a viable fetus is actionable under
Kentucky's abortion statutes thereby preempting coverage by the state's general murder statutes).
228. Id. at 63.

229. See id.
230. See id. at 64.
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known, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was killing a viable fetus.23 '
Without specific legal guidelines, a jury's resolution of these factual
questions would be based on speculation. 2
Courts have also relied on the treatment of an unborn, viable fetus
by various jurisdictions under their criminal homicide statutes to
support the exclusion of an unborn child as a murder victim. For
example, despite the North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in
DiDonato v. Wortman2 3 that a viable fetus is a human being under the
Wrongful Death Act,24 the same court, in State v. Beale,2' refused to
extend the murder statute to include a viable, unborn child.2 6 Noting
that Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Wisconsin courts had
abandoned the common law requirement," the Beale court stated that
"the overwhelming majority of courts which have considered the issue
[have] concluded that the killing of a viable but unborn child is not
murder under the common law.''3s
2. Born Alive Rule-Vehicular Manslaughter Statutes
When presented with the issue of whether to apply the limitations
of the Born Alive Rule to vehicular homicide statutes, courts have again
sought assistance from legislative intent, the rules of statutory
construction, and interpretation of their state's wrongful death statute,
restraining from determining whether a fetus possesses the
characteristics necessary for personhood.
Courts which previously held that their state's wrongful death
statute did not include recovery for the wrongful death of an unborn,
viable child, also denied that a defendant could be criminally liable for
the death of such a fetus under their vehicular homicide statute. 3 9 In
State v. McCall,' the Florida District Court of Appeals was presented
with the issue of determining whether an unborn, full-term fetus is a

231. See id.
232. See id.
233. 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987).
234. See id. at 495.
235. 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989).
236. See id. at 4.
237. See id. at 2-4 (describing Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984); State
v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); and Fosterv. State, 196 N.W. 233 (Vis. 1923)).
238. Id. at 3.
239. See Klasing, supra note 30, at 954 (noting that "[o]nly when the civil standard requires
the child be born alive have courts sought consistency in the criminal law").
240. 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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"human being" within its vehicular homicide statutes." Due to the lack

of precedent in the area of criminal homicide,"2 the court relied in part
on the construction of the word "person" within Florida's Wrongful

Death Act."3 Based on the persistence of the Born Alive doctrine in
negligence law and the strict construction of penal statutes, the court
held that "there are no such crimes as vehicular homicide and D[riving]

W[hile] I[ntoxicated] manslaughter of a viable but unborn child."
However, the court followed its holding with the statement: "We do not

hold that a viable fetus is not alive nor do we hold that a person should
not be punished for causing its death."'

5

Thus, the court implicitly

asserted that determining the legal status of a viable fetus under
vehicular homicide statutes does not necessitate an inquiry as to what

constitutes personhood.
Even those courts which had previously endowed a viable fetus
with legal status for purposes of the wrongful death statute reconciled
their reluctance to recognize a viable fetus for purposes of vehicular
homicide. These courts justified the inconsistency by distinguishing
their authority in the areas of criminal and tort laws based on legislative
intent, differing objectives, and the differing rules of statutory

construction. In State v. Soto,2 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
the accused was not liable under the vehicular homicide statute for the
death of an eight-and-one-half-month-old viable fetus. ' s The fetus died

241. See id. at 876. Florida's vehicular homicide statute imposes criminal liability for -'the
killing of a human being' by the reckless operation of a motor vehicle." Id. (quoting FLA. STAT.
ch. 782.071 (1983)). Florida's driving while intoxicated manslaughter statute -provides that any
person who causes the death 'of any human being' by the operation of a motor vehicle %,hile
intoxicated shall be guilty of manslaughter." Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 316.1931(2) (1933)1.
242. Florida had never dealt with a case involving the homicide of an unborn child. See id.
at 877.
243. See id. (citing to Stern v Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977), %,hich excluded viable
fetuses, subsequently stillborn, from the definition of "person" for purposes of recovery under
Florida's Wrongful Death Act).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. 378 N.W.2d 625 (linn. 1985).
247. Minnesota's vehicular homicide statute provides in part:
"'Whoever causes the death of
a human being not constituting murder or manslaughter as a result of operating a vehicle ... is
guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in death."' Id. at 627 n.3 (quoting MNtV;. STAT.
§ 609.21(1) (1984)) (alteration in original).
248. See hi at 630. The court refused to impose criminal liability because:
The common law, case law from other jurisdictions, our rules on statutory
interpretation of criminal statutes, and the statutory history have convinced us that it is
not within our judicial province, under the guise of interpretation, to hold that the
words "human being" as used in [Minnesota's vehicular homicide statute] encompass a
viable [eight-and-one-half-month-old] fetus.
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in utero due to injuries sustained when the defendant, under the
influence of alcohol, drove his car into an intersection and collided with
the vehicle driven by the viable, unborn child's mother.249
However, in Verkennes v. Corniea,2" the same court allowed the
beneficiaries of an unborn, viable fetus to recover damages under
Minnesota's wrongful death statute.25' The Soto court distinguished its
holding in Verkennes on three bases. First, the wrongful death statute
provides a civil remedy that "focuses on compensating a future interest
of a survivor, not a present interest of a decedent."' 2 Second, because
Minnesota is a "code state," the legislature deprived the courts of
authority to use its common law power to create new crimes. 3 Finally,
other jurisdictions that have allowed recovery for the wrongful death of
viable fetuses, have rejected the use of civil tort law precedent to
impose criminal liability for the killing of an unborn child.2 For all of
these reasons, the court concluded that, by inferring that the legislature
intended homicide statutes to cover the actions of a defendant who kills
a viable, but unborn, child, the court "would be drastically rewriting the
homicide statutes under the guise of 'construing' them." '
After determining that an unborn fetus is a "person" under Rhode
Island's Wrongful Death Act,2 6 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
determined whether an unborn fetus is a "person" within the state's
vehicular homicide statute in State v. Amaro. " The Amaro court first
distinguished its holding in Presley based on the different rules of
statutory construction that govern the area of tort law as opposed to
those that control the area of criminal law. 8 While a wrongful death
statute is remedial in nature and subject to liberal interpretation, a
homicide statute is penal in nature and, thus, the "defendant must be

Id.
249. See id. at 626-27.
250. 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
251. See id. at 841. Minnesota's wrongful death statute provides that "'[w]hen death is caused
by the wrongful act or omission of any person .... the personal representative of the decedent
may maintain an action therefor if he might have maintained an action, had he lived, for an injury
caused by the same act or omission.' Id. at 839 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (West
1949)). This statute has also been called the "Death by Wrongful Act Statute." See, e.g., Soto, 378
N.W.2d at 630.
252. Soto, 378 N.W.2d at 630.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. See Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748,754 (R.I. 1976).
257. 448 A.2d 1257, 1258 (R.I. 1982).
258. See id. at 1259-60.
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given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether the act charged
is within the meaning of the statute."
Second, the court examined the intent of the legislature."" The
court inferred that, since the legislature's familiarity with the common
law rule is presumed in the absence of an express mandate to the
contrary, the legislature intended to preserve the Born Alive Rule when
it enacted the vehicular homicide statute.2" The court concluded that
Rhode Island's vehicular homicide statute does not recognize an unborn
fetus as a "person." '62
3. Viable, Unborn Child-Murder Statutes
In State v. Honze, 63 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
unanimously held that the killing of a viable fetus constituted homicide
within its murder statute. 6 In reaching this holding, the court focused
on its "duty to develop the common law of South Carolina to better
serve an ever-changing society as a whole."I" The court also noted that
"[i]t would be grossly inconsistent ... to construe a viable fetus as a
'person' for the purposes of imposing civil liability while refusing to
give it a similar classification in the criminal context."': The court,
however, declared that liability will be imposed only if the state proves
the viability of the fetus beyond a reasonable doubt." '
4. Viable, Unborn Child-Vehicular Manslaughter Statutes
Courts that seek to expand criminal liability to include punishment
for causing the death of an unborn child rely on their recognition of a
fetus as a person under wrongful death statutes to strengthen their
reasoning in favor of abandoning the Born Alive Rule. Commonwealth
v. Cass was one of the first cases to abandon the common law rule in
the context of vehicular homicide statutes.- ' The court extensively
discussed its decision to impose criminal liability for the death of a
259. Id. at 1259.
260. See i at 1259-60.
261. See i at 1259.

262. See i at 1260.
263. 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
264. See id. at 704. South Carolina's murder statute provides: "Murder' is the killing of any,
person with malice aforethought, either express or implied." S.C. CODE AN. § 16-3-10 iLav. Coop. 1985).

265. Home, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
266. Id.

267. See id.
268. 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984).

269. See Klasing, supra note 30, at 957.
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viable, unborn child. The court first examined its holding in Mone v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc.,2 0 which held that a viable fetus is a "person"
within the wrongful death statute."7 The Cass court also reasoned that
its decision was in accord with the legislature's intent.7 Since the
vehicular homicide statute was enacted subsequent to the court's
decision in Mone, the court presumed that the legislature was aware of
the Mone court's rejection of the common law. 3
The court then examined the statute in light of the rule that "'[in
construing a statute, words are to be accorded their ordinary meaning
and approved usage."'274 Based on this rule of statutory construction, the
court inferred that the term "person" is synonymous with the term
27 The
"human being.""
court concluded that "[a]n offspring of human
parents cannot reasonably be considered to be other than a human being,
and therefore a person, first within, and then in normal course outside,
' 276
the womb.
The court also explained that it had a duty to redefine the meaning
of the common law in light of scientific advances which have
undermined the rationale underlying the Born Alive Rule.' "Medical
science now may provide competent proof as to whether the fetus was
alive at the time of a defendant's conduct and whether his conduct was
the cause of [the fetus'] death."7 8 The court further clarified its position
by asserting that the difficulty of proving causation and the fear of
speculation are not sufficient to consider the killing of a fetus as
homicide.279
However, the court declined to apply its new rule to the defendant
due to a lack of fair warning and the possibility of constitutional
objections, even though the court realized that it was unlikely that the
defendant acted in reliance of the prior state of the law."' While the
270. 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975).
271. See id. at917.
272. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1325-27.
273. See id. at 1325.
274. Id. (quoting Hashimi v. Kalil, 446 N.E.2d 1387, 1389 (Mass. 1983)) (alteration in
original).
275. See id.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 1328.
278. Id.
279. See id. at 1328-29.
280. See id. at 1329. The court noted that every jurisdiction that has addressed the status of an
unborn fetus in the context of homicide cases has declined to recognize the killing of an unborn
fetus as homicide. See id. The only jurisdiction to hold that their homicide statutes cover unborn,
viable fetuses are those that are mandated to do so by statute. See id.
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court recognized that the defendant had notice that his conduct was
criminal, he could not have foreseen the increased punishment resulting
from the one specific consequence of his conductC'
State v. Knapp' presented the Missouri Court of Appeals with the
issue of "whether a viable fetus is a 'person' within the meaning of
[Missouri's] involuntary manslaughter statute."" The court held that a
viable fetus is within the purview of the statute.' Citing O'Grady i%
Brown28" and Roe v. Wade, the court recognized that Missouri had a
legitimate interest in protecting a viable child."'
In O'Grady, the court held that a viable fetus is within the scope of
Missouri's wrongful death statute.?" The court also noted the Supreme
Court's comment in Roe that ".in assessing the state's interest
recognition may be given to the... claim that as long as potentiallife is
involved, the state may assert interests beyond the protection of the
pregnant woman alone."' '
The Knapp court relied on the O'Grady court's analysis as well as
legislative intent to support its abandonment of the common law Born
Alive Rule. It asserted that, because the manslaughter statute was
enacted subsequent to the O'Grady decision, in the absence of an
explicit pronouncement to the contrary, the legislature is presumed to
have included viable fetuses as persons within the statute. "
However, unlike the Cass court, the Knapp court declined to
restrain application of its new rule by applying it prospectively.Y" The
court noted that "'[w]hile the exact consequences may not have
occurred to [defendant], the criminality of his conduct could hardly
have been in doubt."' 291
Relying on Massachusetts' abandonment of the Born Alive Rule;
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Hughes v. State 2 also
rejected the Born Alive Rule.' In addition to the arguments proposed
281.

See id.

282. No. WD 44098, 1991 Mo. App. LFXIS 1883, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 3. 1991).
283. Id. at *2.

284. See id.
285. 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983).
286. See Knapp, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 1883, at *4-*5.
287. See O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910.

288. Id. at 909 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973)) (alteration in original).
289. See Knapp, 1991 Mo. App. LEXS 1883, at *6-*7.

290. Seeid. at*10-*11.
291. Id. at *11 (quoting Meadows v. State, 722 S.W.2d 584. 589 (A&,. 1987,
dissenting)).

Ha)s. J.,

292. 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
293. Seeid at731.
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by the Cass court, the Hughes court also based its decision on the
purpose of its vehicular manslaughter statute and the desire to
consistently apply criminal and civil law, the latter of which already
recognized prenatal tort rights. 294 The purpose of Missouri's
manslaughter statute is to protect human life.295 "[T]he term 'human
being' in... its plain and ordinary meaning.., includes a viable human
fetus," thus protecting an unborn, viable child under the statute." 6
Second, the court stated that its redefinition of the common law is
supported by the abandonment of the Born Alive Rule, and the
subsequent allowance of wrongful death actions for the death of a
viable, unborn fetus.297
5. Nonviable, Unborn Child-Murder Statutes
Although courts have been reluctant to expand the scope of
homicide statutes to include an unborn child, a minority of courts have
abandoned the Born Alive Rule in the absence of express legislative
mandate to the contrary, and extended protection under homicide
statutes to viable fetuses. 29 Courts have been even more reluctant to
extend protection under homicide statutes to pre-viable fetuses.
However, courts have not invalidated legislation extending protection to
an unborn fetus in the area of criminal law. This fact provides additional
support to the argument that the legal status of a fetus as a "person" is
not based on the objective determination that a fetus possesses some
intrinsic quality that is necessary for personhood.
In response to the California Supreme Court's affirmation of the
Born Alive Rule in Keeler v. Superior Court,299 the California
Legislature amended California's murder statute, California Penal Code
section 1872' Section 187 was originally enacted in 1872 and governed
criminal prosecutions for homicide when Keeler was decided."' The
murder statute provided that "'[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a
human being, with malice aforethought."' 3 Relying on the plain

294. See id. at 734. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla.
1976), recognized a statutory cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. See Id. at
927-28.
295. See Hughes, 868 P.2d at 734.
296. Id.
297. See id.
298. See generally supra Parts 11.B, III.B.1-2 (discussing criminal liability).
299. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
300. See Folger, supra note 49, at 244.
301. See id. at 242.
302. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 619 n.2 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1872)).
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language of the statute, the court held that the killing of a viable fetus

can not be prosecuted as murder unless the fetus is born alive!"
Subsequent to Keeler, the California Legislature amended the

California Penal Code to expressly allow criminal liability for the
killing of a fetus."" However, the legislature left the term "fetus"

undefined."' Subsequent cases read the requirement of viability into the
statute." ' For example, in People v. Snith,"'7 the California Court of
Appeals held that viability is an essential element of murder under the
revised murder statute. 3 The Smith court reasoned that "one cannot
destroy independent human life prior to the time it has come into
existence." '
Despite precedent that consistently construed section 187 of

California's Penal Code to include viability as an essential element of
fetal murder, the California Supreme Court in People v. Davis t
interpreted the term "fetus" according to the medical-legal dictionary."'
"[T]he [Davis] court ...held that the third-party killing of a fetus is
murder under section 187 where 'the state can show that the fetus
' 12 has

progressed beyond the embryonic stage of seven to eight weeks.'

303. See id. at 622-24.
304. See Folger, supra note 49, at 244. The amended California Penal Code section 187
defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (Vest 1994 & Supp. 2001). Although fetal murder constitutes a crime
in California, the state does not recognize a crime of fetal manslaughter. See Folger, supra note 49,
at 245 n.68.
305. See Folger, supra note 49, at 238.
306. Viability was read into the California statute after the Supreme Court's decision in Rae
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Folger, supra note 49, at 247. See generally id. at 245-54
(explaining the development of the viability requirement under California's revised murder
statute).
307. 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976).
308. See id. at 503-04.
309. Id. at 502.
310. 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
at 599; see also Folger, supra note 49, at 238 (quoting People v. Dais, 872 P.2d
311. See id.
591, 602 (Cal. 1994)).
312. Folger, supra note 49, at 238 (quoting People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 602 (Cal. 1994,).
An interesting point to note is that in Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). "the
expert testimony... concluded 'with reasonable medical certainty' that the fetus had developed to
the stage of viability, i.e., that in the event of premature birth on the date in question it vould have
had a 75 percent to 96 percent chance of survival." Id. at 619 (quoting the expert %vitn is). In
Dais, "the prosecution's medical experts testified [that] the fetus' statistical chances of sur val
outside the womb were between 7 and 47 percent ...[and] [t]he defense medical expert testified
[that] . -. 'its chances were only 2 or 3 percent.' Davis, 872 P.2d at 593 (quoting expert
witnesses).
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6. Feticide Statutes
Although courts have been unwilling to expand the term "person,"

"individual," or "human being" in homicide statutes to include unborn
fetuses from the moment of conception, courts have extended such
protection when the legislature enacts separate homicide statutes
31 3

expressly including an unborn child from the moment of fertilization.

However, while feticide statutes protect an unborn child from the

moment of fertilization, they protect a fetus only as a "potential life"
and not as a "person.,

314

Because feticide statutes are intended to protect

an unborn child as a "potential life," they do not provide a fetus the
same protection afforded to a person under criminal law. 35" The statutory
penalty imposed on a criminal defendant who causes the death of a fetus

is "far less severe" than the punishment imposed for killing a
"person.""'

In State v. Merrill,3 7 the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of the state's feticide statute,

which criminalized the

intentional killing of an unborn child, regardless of its developmental
stage. 31 9 The court commented that fetal homicide statutes are intended
to protect the "'potentiality of human life' [which] includes protection

of the unborn child, whether an embryo or a nonviable or viable
fetus. ' 32 The Merrill court expressly stated that the feticide statute does

not require "the living organism in the womb in its embryonic or fetal

313. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(5) (West 1989 & Supp. 2000)
(manslaughter); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2(a), (b) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (intentional
homicide of an unborn child); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (West 1998) (intentional termination
of a human pregnancy to prevent live birth or remove a dead fetus); MINN. STAT. ANN,
§ 609.266(a) (West 1987) (defining "unborn child" for the purposes of its unborn child murder
statute). See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7) (West 1997) (defining the term "person" in
the criminal code to include an unborn child from the moment of fertilization and implantation).
314. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1990).
315. See Kime, supra note 48, at 548-49.
316. See Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321; see also, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13I103(A)(5), 03), 13-701(C)(2) (classifying feticide as a class three felony punishable by a threeand-one-half-year sentence for a first offender); IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 35-42-1-6, 35-50-2-6
(classifying feticide as a Class C felony punishable by a four year sentence).
317. 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).
318. Minnesota's feticide statute "provides in part: Whoever does any of the following is
guilty of murder of an unborn child in the first degree ...(1) causes the death of an unborn child
with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the unborn child." Id. at 320 n.1 (quoting
MINN. STAT. § 609.2661(1) (1988)). The statute defined "[tihe term 'unborn child' [as] 'the
unborn offspring of a human being conceived, but not yet born."' Id. at 320-21 (quoting MINN.
STAT. § 609.266(a) (1988)).
319. See id. at 322 (holding that Minnesota's feticide statute is constitutional).
320. Id.
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state be considered a person or a human being."' ' Criminal liability
only requires that the genetically human embryo have the capacity to
develop into a human being."
In People v. Ford,"- the Appellate Court of Illinois addressed the

constitutionality of Illinois' feticide statute. " ' The court noted that the
purpose of the feticide statute is to protect the potentiality of human
life.38 The court reasoned that the imposition of liability for the killing
of an unborn fetus would deter others from engaging in such harmful
conduct, thus protecting potential human life."" The Fordcourt asserted
that the issue of when a fetus acquires personhood is irrelevant in

determining criminal liability

'7

The court reasoned that liability only

requires that the unborn child have had the capacity to develop into a
human being and that the defendant's conduct deprived the fetus of this

opportunity.'
IV. POTENTIALITY

AS THE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE LEGAL
STATUS OF AN UNBORN CHILD

The treatment of a fetus under wrongful death statutes and
homicide statutes of varying states reveals that courts confer legal
standing on a fetus independent of its personhood. The method of
analysis adopted by courts balances various factors, such as legislative
intent, the purpose of the statute involved, logic, the rules of statutory
construction, precedent, and developments in medical technology.
Courts are able to manipulate the treatment of an unborn child under
wrongful death and homicide statutes by altering the factors they
consider in their determination. Application of a similar methodology
leads to the conclusion that the better standard is one which recognizes a
fetus as "potential life" and confers legal standing on a fetus at
conception.

321. Id at 324.
322. See id.

323. 581 N.E.2d 1189 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
324. See id. at 1198. The court concluded that Illinois' feticide statute is constitutional. See
id. at 1201. Illinois' feticide statute provides in part:
"'A person commits the offense of intentional
homicide of an unborn child, if [he] perform[s] acts which cause the death of an unborn child.'" Id.
at 1198 (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2(a) (1987)). The "statute defines an 'unborn child'
as 'any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth."' Id. (quoting 720 ILL CamP.
STAT. 5/9-1.2(b)(1) (1987)).
325. See id. at 1200.
326. See id.
327. See id. at 1201.
328. See id.
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First, consistency with the holding in Roe v. Wade329 requires the
protection of potential human life in the absence of a countervailing
fundamental right or a more compelling state interest.330 The Roe Court
asserted that the state has a legitimate and compelling interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life.3 ' However, the Court also
determined that a woman has a constitutional right to privacy and that
right includes the choice to continue or terminate a pregnancy.332 This
right to choose outweighs the state's interest in protecting potential life
until viability.3 3 Thus, the Court identified viability as the demarcation
when the state's interest in potential human life outweighs a woman's
right to privacy allowing the state to forbid abortions after viability.-"
However, the Court also asserted that the state's interest in protecting
the life and health of the mother, an existing human life, is more
compelling than the state's interest in preserving the potential human
life of a viable fetus, thus permitting abortions after viability when
medically necessary to ensure maternal health.335
When a similar balancing analysis is applied to the conduct of a
third party, which causes the termination of potential life, protecting
potential life from conception does not interfere with any
constitutionally protected fundamental right of the third party. The
state's interest in protecting potential human life is greater than an
assailant's interest in causing the death of a fetus. Moreover, a woman's
right to continue her pregnancy outweighs a defendant's interest in
terminating the pregnancy.336 Courts have upheld the constitutional
validity of feticide statutes, which protect an unborn child from the
moment of conception.337 Applying the same rationale, courts have
concluded that a feticide statute does not deprive a defendant of any
countervailing right.3 38 Courts assert that, while the decision in Roe
grants a woman the right to terminate her pregnancy under certain

329. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
330. See id. at 163-64 (holding that the state's interest in protecting the life of a viable fetus is
compelling and legitimate, but may be sacrificed to protect the life of the mother).
331. See id.
332. See id. at 153.
333. See id. at 163-64.
334. See id.
335. See id. at 163-65.
336. A woman's right to continue her pregnancy is constitutionally protected. See id. at 153.
App. Ct. 1991); State v. Merrill,
337. See, e.g., People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1201 (Ill.
450 N.W.2d 318, 324 (Minn. 1990); see also supra Part In.B.6 (discussing the constitutionality of
feticide statutes).
338. See Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1200; Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321.
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circumstances, "it does not protect, much less confer on an assailant, a
third-party unilateral right to destroy the fetus."' '
Second, under Roe v. Wade, protection of a fetus from conception
would subject a woman to governmental interference and compulsion,
restraining her ight to decide whether to terminate or continue the
pregnancy.' However, the expansion of a civil or criminal statute to
include an unborn fetus, viable or nonviable, within the definition of the
word "person" does not increase governmental interference in the
conduct of third parties. Civil and criminal statutes that impose liability
for the death of a fetus are by nature reflective of already valid criminal
statutes. By constraining conduct that causes the death of a fetus, they
are merely outlawing the already illegal infliction of harm against the
mother.
Moreover, although liability under feticide statutes does not require
that the defendant, or the pregnant woman, be aware of the pregnancy,
the imposition of liability is not inconsistent with other homicide
statutes. Under the doctrine of transferred intent, criminal conduct may
not be excused simply because the defendant's victim proves not to be
the victim the defendant had in mind." Thus, just as a defendant is
liable for homicide if he or she intends to kill one person and mistakenly
kills another he or she did not know was present, a defendant should be
liable for the homicide of a fetus even if he or she intended only to kill
the mother.
Third, "'potential life is no less potential in the first weeks of
pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward."' ' 2 The only interest that
increases during pregnancy is the probability that the potential life will
be fulfilled. 343 The compelling interest in preserving the probability of
human life is more effectively fulfilled if a fetus is protected during the
most crucial period in fetal development; the first trimester, which is
before the viability stage.' Due to the vulnerability of a fetus to outside
influences, an unborn child is more likely to die from injury inflicted

339. Merrill,450 N.W.2d at 322.

340. See id.
341. See Merrill,450 N.W.2d at 323.
342. Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Propositionthat "Life Begins at Conception,"

43 STAN.L. Rv. 599, 600 n.7 (1991) (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Cir. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416,461 (1983) (O'Connor, L, dissenting)).
343. See id at 607 n.56.
344. See Tony Hartsoe, Person or Thing-4n Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus:A Survey
of North CarolinaLaw, 17 CAMPBELLL. REv. 169, 193 (1995).
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before reaching viability than if such harm were inflicted after
viability m5
Fourth, conferring legal status on an unborn child at the moment of
conception provides a bright-line standard. A viability test "is
impossible of practical application.""' 6 The point in prenatal
development at which a fetus attains viability depends on multiple
factors including "the period of gestation, the health and hereditary
makeup of the fetus, the characteristics of the mother, and the
availability and quality of prenatal medical care."'
Thus, proving
viability is difficult.M8 As a result, the determination of the legal status
of an unborn child based on viability will be based on speculation.1 9
The point of viability also shifts as medical technology advances
increasing the survivability of a fetus outside the womb at earlier stages
in development.350 Allowing a cause of action from the moment of
conception eliminates the costs and effort associated with repeatedly
reevaluating the standard as medical science continues to progress.'
Finally, a standard based on conception more effectively furthers
the purposes of wrongful death statutes and homicide statutes. Allowing
recovery under wrongful death statutes for the death of a fetus
regardless of viability provides compensation for a recognized loss,
since a woman has a constitutional right in the potential human life. The
imposition of severe penalties for wrongful conduct which causes the
death of a fetus will also deter others from committing similar crimes.' 2
In addition, such a standard will protect the interests of the mother and
her right to decide to continue the pregnancy. 353
V.

CONCLUSION

At first glance, the debate regarding the legal status of a fetus for
purposes of wrongful death statutes and homicide statutes seems to
center on whether a fetus is a "person" and at what stage of
development a fetus becomes a "person." However, closer scrutiny
reveals that the status of a fetus in society is evaluated within a socially
345. See id.
346. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960).
347. Jim Hutcherson, Note, North Carolina Recognizes a Cause of Action for the Wrongful
Death of a Viable Fetus-DiDonatov. Wortman, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 849, 867-68 (1988).
348. See Hartsoe, supra note 344, at 192.
349. See id.
350. See id. at 192-93.
351. See id. at 194.
352. See People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
353. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321-22 (Minn. 1990).
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constructed framework without regard to whether a fetus possesses the
intrinsic qualifies necessary for personhood. The use of a subjective
criterion created by society, rather than an objective standard based on
the elements of personhood, has allowed courts to deal with cases where
the conduct of a third party causes the death of a fetus without
addressing the difficult issue of whether a fetus is a "person." Moreover,
such a standard has resulted in the diverging treatment of a fetus under
wrongful death statutes and homicide statutes.
The legal system has determined the extent to which a fetus should
be protected under civil and criminal law by balancing various factors
such as legislative intent, rules of statutory construction, the purpose of
wrongful death liability and homicide convictions, logic, precedent, and
changes in medical science. As demonstrated in this Note, applying a
comparable methodology leads to the conclusion that the legal
personality of potential life should commence at the moment of
potentiality, namely conception. While courts, legislatures, scientists,
and philosophers may never be able to resolve the question as to
whether a fetus is a "person," extending the protections granted to a
human being to a fetus, as a potential human life, from the moment of
conception will provide consistency in the law, more effectively fulfill
the social framework under which the legal status of a fetus is
evaluated, and coincide with our innate reactions that a fetus has value,
even though we are unable to exactly identify why or what.
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